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Abstract 
Using panel data from US states over the period 1941-2002, I measure the impact of 
gubernatorial partisanship on a wide range of different policy settings and economic 
outcomes. Across 32 measures, there are surprisingly few differences in policy settings, 
social outcomes and economic outcomes under Democrat and Republican Governors. In 
terms of policies, Democratic Governors tend to prefer slightly higher minimum wages. 
Under Republican Governors, incarceration rates are higher, while welfare caseloads are 
higher under Democratic Governors. In terms of social and economic outcomes, 
Democratic Governors tend to preside over higher median post-tax income, lower post-
tax inequality, and lower unemployment rates. However, for 26 of the 32 dependent 
variables, gubernatorial partisanship does not have a statistically significant impact on 
policy outcomes and social welfare. I find no evidence of gubernatorial partisan 
differences in tax rates, welfare generosity, the number of government employees or their 
salaries, state revenue, incarceration rates, execution rates, pre-tax incomes and 
inequality, crime rates, suicide rates, and test scores. These results are robust to the use of 
regression discontinuity estimation, to take account of the possibility of reverse causality. 
Overall, it seems that Governors behave in a fairly non-ideological manner. 
 
Keywords: median voter theorem, partisanship, state government, taxation, expenditure, 
welfare, crime, growth 
JEL Classifications: D72, D78, H71, H72, I38 
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1. Introduction 
 
What do Democrats and Republicans do? On one level, this is the question that millions of 
American voters ask themselves as they enter the ballot boxes. Yet in an empirical sense, we 
know surprisingly little about how policy choices and welfare outcomes differ under the two 
major political parties. This paper seeks to provide evidence on partisan differences, by using 
panel data to explore the policies and outcomes under US state governments over the past six 
decades. 
 
Politico-economic models commonly characterize political parties as merely two teams of self-
interested players, willing to present any set of policies that will win them a plurality of the vote. 
Under the classic model put forward by Downs (1957), candidates’ motivations for competing 
for office are solely to enjoy its perquisites. This model is the dominant one in the literature. 
Indeed, as Roemer (2001) points out, the oft-cited “median voter theorem” is the Nash 
equilibrium result that follows from an application of the Downsian model, where voter 
preferences are unidimensional. Under Downs’ model, party ideology is irrelevant – rather than 
labeling the two largest parties “left” and “right”, one might as well call them “A” and “B”.  
 
Others, however, have attempted to explicitly model the role of ideology. Wittman (1973) 
proposes a model in which parties have policy preferences, which represent the aggregate utility 
of their members.1 Dixit and Londregan (1998) characterize redistributive ideology as 
exogenous, and show how the choice of outcomes is a function of ideology, the “power hunger” 
of each party, the variance of pre-tax incomes, and the political power of poor and rich 
constituents.  
 
Another strand in the literature goes further still, and models outcomes as a product not only of 
electoral competition between parties, but also competition within parties. Thus Dhami (2003) 
describes a system in which each party has two factions – opportunists and militants. Roemer 
(2001) goes further still – modeling three factions within each of the major parties (militants, 
                                                 
1 Roemer (2001, 28) points out that Wittman’s model has much in common with the work of Lipset (1960), who 
argued that political parties are the instruments of different economic classes. 
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opportunists, and reformists), a two-dimensional policy space (left-right and authoritarian-
libertarian), and uncertainty about the mapping of policies onto outcomes. As examples of the 
issues that might characterize the left-right and authoritarian-libertarian divides, Roemer 
suggests taxation and race, respectively. 
 
What empirical evidence exists on partisan differences? Most research on partisanship has 
tended to focus on macroeconomic outcomes. Hibbs (1987) and Alesina and Rosenthal (1995) 
present models in which an exploitable Phillips curve is available to policymakers.2 They find 
that under Democratic Presidents, growth is higher, and unemployment lower; while under 
Republican Presidents, inflation is lower. Across developed democracies, Lange and Garrett 
(1985) and Scruggs (2001) find evidence that when countries have left-leaning governments or 
strong labor movements, they tend to grow more slowly, but the presence of both (or neither) 
leads to more rapid growth and investment. 
 
Turning to income distribution, Stigler (1970) contended that as parties pursued the median 
voter, both will tend to redistribute towards the middle class, at the expense of rich and poor. Yet 
Bartels (2003) finds otherwise. Comparing the rate of growth of each quintile in the population, 
Bartels concludes that the partisan gap is greatest for those at the 20th percentile, who can expect 
their incomes to grow 2.4 percent faster under a Democratic President than under a Republican 
President. When unemployment, inflation and GDP growth rates are included in the model, the 
partisan effect disappears, suggesting that at the federal level, macroeconomic management is the 
main channel through which policymakers affect the distribution of income. None of these 
models account for the potential endogeneity of party choice (though this is hardly surprising, 
given the relatively small number of US federal elections for which good income distribution 
data exists).  
 
At a US state level, several studies have found partisan effects that are close to zero. For 
example, Plotnick and Winters (1985) looked at partisanship and AFDC benefit generosity; 
                                                 
2 The difference between the models is that Hibbs (1987) assumes backward-looking inflation expectations, while 
Alesina and Rosenthal (1995) assume rational expectations over inflation. In support of the rational partisan model, 
Alesina and Rosenthal present evidence that the partisan gap is largest in the first half of each election term (1995, 
180-181). 
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Dilger (1998) estimated partisan impacts on nine tax and expenditure variables; Garand (1988) 
focused on the size of the state government; Erikson, Wright and McIver (1989) used as their 
dependent variable an eight-item measure of party liberalism; Poterba (1994) analyzed states’ 
responses to unexpected budget deficits; and Gilligan and Matsusaka (1995) looked at 
partisanship and government expenditure. As Erikson, Wright and McIver (1989) note, the 
findings of these studies generally accord with the median voter theorem: “although state 
Republican and Democratic parties tend to represent ideological extremes, they also respond to 
state opinions – perhaps even to the point of enacting similar policies when in legislative 
control.”  
 
Others, however, have discerned state-level partisan differences in particular policy areas. Alt 
and Lowry (2000) show that Democrats in non-southern states tend to target a greater share of 
incomes towards government spending, with most of the effect driven by legislative partisanship. 
Consistent with this, Caplan (2001) finds that state taxation levels are positively correlated with 
the proportion of Democratic legislators, and Reed (2006) concludes that taxes are higher when 
the legislature is under Democratic control. Analyzing governors who are barred by term-limits 
from seeking re-election, Besley and Case (1995) find that Democratic governors raise taxes 
more than Republicans, while Republican governors allow the minimum wage to fall more than 
Democrats. Using panel data over a similar period to that covered in this paper, Besley and Case 
(2003) estimate the effect of partisanship on total taxes, total spending, family assistance, and 
workers’ compensation spending. Measuring partisanship as the share of Democrats in the state 
upper house and lower house, and the party of the Governor, they find that although their 
individual partisanship variables are mostly insignificant, they are jointly significant for each of 
the four dependent variables.  
 
This paper represents an advance over the previous literature in three respects. First, while some 
(though not all) of the previous papers use cross-sectional variation, it uses panel data, 
controlling for state and year fixed effects that might have a direct impact on policies and 
outcomes. Second, it tests the impact of partisanship on a much wider array of policy variables 
and outcomes than previous papers have done. Third, it explicitly models the impact of voter 
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ideology on political outcomes, and takes into account the possibility that party choice may be 
endogenous to expected economic circumstances in the future.  
 
In analyzing differences between Democrats and Republicans, I consider three sets of outcomes. 
The first are pure policy variables, such as the minimum wage and tax rates, which can be 
cleanly measured and which reflect only the choices made by policymakers. The second category 
of outcomes are those that reflect both policy choices and economic conditions, such as 
expenditure on transfer programs (which is a function of both the supply of and demand for 
welfare), or the incarceration rate (a function of the strictness of the police and legal system and 
the number of crimes committed). The third category are pure welfare variables, such as mean 
incomes, unemployment, inequality, education, crime and suicide.  
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the empirical strategy. 
Section 3 presents results, and the final section concludes.  
 
2. An Empirical Strategy for Estimating Partisan Effects 
 
To gauge the causal effect of partisanship on state outcomes, I focus on governors, rather than 
state legislatures. This is partly because most of the existing literature on partisanship has 
concerned itself with the affiliation of the chief executive, rather than the legislature. In addition, 
credible identification of election outcomes is more straightforward in a two-person contest. A 
governor who wins with 50.1 percent of the vote is considerably less constrained in her actions 
than a legislature in which one party holds the balance of power by a one-vote margin. 
 
To model how partisanship affects a given outcome, I regress a given policy or outcome on an 
indicator for whether the Governor is a Democrat. Since policies and economic outcomes tend to 
be correlated within states and within years, all specifications include both state and year fixed 
effects.3 To this parsimonious specification, I then progressively add the following additional 
controls:  
                                                 
3 Indeed, policies may even be correlated with one another, suggesting that they should be estimated using a 
Seemingly Unrelated Regression model. The drawback with such an approach is that not all outcomes are available 
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(i) Time-varying characteristics of the state: The log of its population, and the fraction of 
the state’s population that is under 15, over 65, and African-American. Since many 
policies will have a differential impact on large and small states, young or old voters, or 
on ethnic minorities, these controls take account of the possibility that demographic 
composition of the state has a direct effect on the policy choices of the state government 
or the economic outcomes in a state.  
(ii) Measures of legislative control: Two indicator variables denoting that the Democrats 
control both legislative houses in a given year, or that the Republicans control both 
houses in a given year (the omitted category is split control). This takes account of the 
possibility that the partisan affiliation of the governor may be endogenous to the partisan 
composition of the legislature. 
(iii) Voter ideology: The mean Poole-Rosenthal score (Poole and Rosenthal 1998) for the 
House of Representatives members representing that state in a given year. This shows the 
effect of having a Democrat or Republican Governor, holding constant the ideology of 
the states’ voters, and takes into account the possibility raised by Erikson, Wright and 
McIver (1989): that governors merely respond to voter ideology. 
 
To take account of serial correlation over time within a state, standard errors are clustered at the 
state level.4 
 
When considering economic outcomes, it is important to note that while policies take effect 
immediately, they may only have an impact on economic conditions after some lag. Given this, 
how should one treat the first year of the election term? One approach would be to simply lag all 
outcomes by one year. For example, suppose an election took place in November 2000, in which 
                                                                                                                                                             
for all years. However, when a SUR model is estimated just on the eight policy variables, the estimates are very 
similar to those derived from estimating the effects of gubernatorial partisanship separately for each dependent 
variable using OLS. 
4 When standard errors are clustered at the state*electoral term level, a larger number of policy settings and 
outcomes are statistically significant. Under that specification, I find that Democratic Governors tend to prefer 
significantly higher minimum wages and more redistributive taxes. In terms of outcomes, clustering at the 
state*electoral term level suggests that Democratic Governors tend to preside over significantly lower incarceration 
rates, higher welfare caseloads, higher median post-tax income, lower post-tax inequality, and lower unemployment 
rates. 
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the Democratic candidate beat the Republican incumbent. In a lagged model, the Republicans 
would nonetheless be assigned the year 2001, and would be attributed the outcomes in the four 
years 1998-2001; while the Democrats would be considered responsible for the years 2002-2005, 
even if the Republicans were returned to office in the November 2004 election. Although such an 
approach has been adopted by Bartels (2003) and others, I prefer a more conservative method of 
dealing with the data. I therefore drop the first year of each gubernatorial term from the sample, 
and use only across the second, third and fourth year of each term. (Where the dependent 
variable is a policy outcome, the issue of lags does not arise, and I therefore keep the first year of 
the term.) 
 
If voter choice is exogenous to expected economic conditions, then the estimates derived from 
the above specifications will accurately reflect the policy choices of Democrats and Republicans. 
However, a question of endogeneity arises. If voters are able to forecast future economic 
circumstances with some accuracy, and if they believe that the parties are differently suited to 
certain economic environments, then the party elected is not exogenous to the prevailing 
economic conditions. For example, suppose that voters thought that Democrats were better able 
to manage the economy in a slump, while Republicans were better able to manage the economy 
in a boom. In this case, Democrats will be more likely to be elected when a recession is on the 
horizon, and the average growth rate under Democrats will be lower than that under Republicans. 
A similar mechanism could apply to other outcomes, such as crime. Thus if voter choice is 
endogenous to the anticipated socio-economic environment when making their party choice, then 
the outcomes observed under Democrats and Republicans may not reflect their respective policy 
choices.  
 
To take account of this possibility, I add a further control to specifications in which the 
dependent variable is a social or economic outcome: 
 
(iv) The share of the vote received by the Democratic gubernatorial candidate: In this 
specification, the policy effect is estimated from the discontinuity that occurs when a 
gubernatorial candidate wins more than 50% of the vote. The use of regression 
discontinuity techniques to study US election outcomes was pioneered by Lee, Moretti 
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and Butler (2004) and Lee (2005), who estimate the causal effect of incumbency on 
winning, and electoral strength on voting patterns.5 Most similar to this paper is the 
approach of Pettersson-Lidbom (2003), who uses regression discontinuity methods to 
estimate the effects of partisanship in Swedish local elections. In the regression 
discontinuity specification, I drop non-contested elections (those in which one party won 
80 percent or more of the vote), and elections in which one of the top two candidates is 
an independent.  
 
Note that the purpose of controlling for the Democrat candidate’s share of the vote is to take into 
account the function through which voters’ expectations of the state of the economy might map 
onto their choice of candidate. Note however that this assumes that governors who win with a 
larger margin will behave in the same manner as those eke out a narrow win. If this is not the 
case, it this will most likely cause attenuation bias in the coefficient of interest.6  
 
Formally, the five equations to be estimated are as follows (for notational simplicity, I omit 
coefficients on all but the main variable of interest): 
 
Yjt = α + βGjt + γj + δt + εjt        (1)  
Yjt = α + βGjt + Xjt + γj + δt + εjt       (2)  
Yjt = α + βGjt + Djt + Rjt + Xjt + γj + δt + εjt      (3) 
Yjt = α + βGjt + Djt + Rjt + Pjt + Xjt + γj + δt + εjt     (4) 
Yjt = α + βGjt + Djt + Rjt + Pjt + Vjt + Xjt + γj + δt + εjt {0.2 > Vjt > 0.8} (5) 
  
In equation (1), Y is a policy setting, social outcome or economic outcome in state j and year t, G 
is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the state has a Democratic Governor, γ and δ are state and 
year fixed effects respectively, and ε is a normally distributed error term. In equations (2) to (5), 
X is a vector of time-varying state characteristics, D is an indicator denoting that Democrats 
control both houses of the state legislature, R is an indicator denoting that Republicans control 
                                                 
5 However, while Lee and co-authors are able to identify 16,000 house races, there are substantially fewer 
gubernatorial elections in the post-war era. As a result, their main empirical strategies – restricting the sample to 
only the closest elections, and including high-order polynomials, are likely to both overtax the available data. 
6 There is a small body of theoretical work (Llavador 2001) and empirical evidence (Diermeier and Merlo 1999) 
suggesting that policy outcomes might be related to vote share. 
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both houses of the state legislature, P is the mean Poole-Rosenthal score for that state’s House of 
Representatives members in a given year, and V is the vote share of the Democratic candidate 
for governor in the most recent election. Equations (1) to (5) correspond to the same-numbered 
columns in Tables 2 to 6 (noting that in Table 2, equation (5) is not estimated for policy 
variables). 
 
Table 1 presents summary statistics for political variables, policy variables, intermediate 
outcomes and welfare measures. To make it more straightforward to interpret the coefficients, 
rates are recoded as percentages (ie. as 0/100 variables rather than 0/1 variables). I use the 
variables across the maximum time period for which they are available, ranging from 1941-2002 
for top tax rates, to 1992-2002 for mean NAEP scores. 
 9
 
Table 1: Summary Statistics      
    Coverage 
Variable Mean SD N From To 
Political variables and controls      
Democrat Governor 0.553 0.497 2982 1941 2003 
Democrat legislature 0.496 0.500 2982 1941 2003 
Democrat Governor & Democrat legislature 0.366 0.482 2810 1941 2003 
Republican Governor & Republican legislature 0.221 0.415 2810 1941 2003 
Vote share of Democrat gubernatorial candidate 0.531 0.141 2933 1941 2003 
Poole-Rosenthal Score of Congressional Reps 0.015 0.194 2969 1941 2003 
Log population 14.741 1.048 2982 1941 2003 
Proportion of population aged under 15 0.263 0.043 2982 1941 2003 
Proportion of population aged under 15 0.094 0.026 2982 1941 2003 
Proportion of population who are black 0.094 0.102 2982 1941 2003 
Policy Settings      
Top income tax rate (%) 4.819 3.888 2846 1941 2003 
Top corporate tax rate (%) 4.847 3.127 2906 1941 2002 
Tax redistribution index 2.451 0.313 1278 1977 2002 
Average income tax rate (%) 15.354 3.043 1278 1977 2002 
Log real minimum wage 1.803 0.140 1428 1973 2001 
Log maximum welfare benefit 6.505 0.467 1806 1960 2002 
State and local employees as a percentage of the 
population (%) 6.030 0.920 1622 1969 2001 
Log average real wage of a state or local 
employee 3.398 0.164 1622 1969 2001 
Intermediate Outcomes      
Unionization rate (%) 18.658 8.599 1901 1964 2002 
Incarceration rate (per 100,000 people) 216.205 125.521 1085 1977 1998 
Number of executions per 100,000 people 0.029 0.092 2982 1941 2004 
Log state and local transfers per capita 3.199 0.964 2036 1958 2001 
Log state UI payments per capita 4.429 0.664 2036 1958 2001 
Proportion of population receiving welfare (%) 3.610 1.610 1327 1976 2002 
Log real state income tax receipts per capita 5.709 1.089 1698 1958 2001 
Log real other state tax receipts per capita 1.761 0.929 2036 1958 2001 
Log real state non-tax revenue per capita 3.169 0.899 2036 1958 2001 
Log real state revenue per capita 5.753 0.943 2036 1958 2001 
Social Welfare Measures      
Log real mean family income (pre-tax) 10.270 0.190 1947 1963 2002 
Log real mean family income (post-tax) 10.651 0.150 1278 1977 2002 
Log real median family income (pre-tax) 10.102 0.190 1947 1963 2002 
Log real median family income (post-tax) 10.533 0.145 1278 1977 2002 
Log mean real wage 10.503 0.173 1230 1977 2001 
Fraction below the poverty line (%) 15.044 9.536 1947 1963 2002 
Gini (pre-tax) 37.414 3.712 1947 1963 2002 
Gini (post-tax) 34.383 3.417 1278 1977 2002 
Unemployment rate (%) 6.040 2.067 1488 1970 2003 
Average NAEP 4th grade score 214.862 7.355 470 1992 2003 
Property crimes per 100,000 people 3782.26 1471.44 2030 1960 2001 
Violent crimes per 100,000 people 373.996 245.589 2030 1960 2001 
Murder rate per 100,000 people 6.539 3.793 2030 1960 2001 
Suicide rate per 100,000 people 12.679 3.271 1611 1964 1996 
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3. Estimating Partisan Differences 
 
Policy Settings 
 
The first set of policies upon which one might expect to observe partisan differences are tax 
policies. To the extent that parties have differing attitudes towards redistribution, they may 
choose to raise or lower the overall tax burden, change the corporate/personal income tax mix, or 
change the redistributivity of the personal income tax.  
 
Given the large number of dependent variables and specifications analyzed in this paper, the 
main tables do not show the coefficients on the control variables. To save space, each cell 
represents the coefficient on an indicator variable for having a Democrat Governor. Full results 
may be found in the working paper version (Leigh 2007). 
 
The first four rows of Table 2 estimate partisan effects for different measures of tax policies. On 
the top personal income tax rate and the corporate tax rate, there are no significant partisan 
differences. The redistributivity of personal income taxation, measured as the difference between 
the pre-tax and post-tax gini coefficients in a simulated model, is not significantly different 
according to the party of the governor. The average personal income tax rate does not appear to 
differ systematically across Democrat and Republican governors. 
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Table 2: Policy Settings 
Each cell is from a separate regression, and represents the marginal effect of having a 
Democratic Governor on various dependent variables 
Dependent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Top income tax rate -0.0376 -0.1841 -0.1937 -0.1936 
 [0.1651] [0.1602] [0.1531] [0.1531] 
Top corporate tax rate 0.0723 -0.0644 -0.0864 -0.1114 
 [0.1492] [0.1264] [0.1181] [0.1156] 
Tax redistributivity -0.0228 -0.0172 -0.0172 -0.0173 
 [0.0143] [0.0130] [0.0131] [0.0139] 
Average income tax rate 0.0906 0.1217 0.106 0.1164 
 [0.1300] [0.1196] [0.1184] [0.1265] 
Minimum wage 0.0092* 0.0091* 0.0089 0.0085 
 [0.0055] [0.0053] [0.0053] [0.0056] 
Maximum AFDC/TANF 
benefit 0.0012 -0.0013 0.0003 0.0004 
 [0.0134] [0.0129] [0.0130] [0.0134] 
Number of state 
employees -0.0202 0.0055 0.0065 0.006 
 [0.0304] [0.0235] [0.0239] [0.0235] 
Average real wage of 
state employees -0.0033 -0.0042 -0.0053 -0.0065 
 [0.0078] [0.0076] [0.0080] [0.0081] 
State and year FE Y Y Y Y 
State demographics  Y Y Y 
Legislative control   Y Y 
Voter ideology    Y 
Notes:  
1. Robust standard errors, clustered at the state level, in brackets. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 
the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
2. Demographic controls are the log of the state population, and the fraction of the state’s population that is under 
15, over 65, and African-American.  
3. Legislative controls are indicator variables for the Democrats having a majority in both houses, and the 
Republicans having a majority in both houses. 
4. Voter ideology is the average Poole-Rosenthal score of the state’s delegation to the federal House of 
Representatives in the most recent election. 
 
The next rows of Table 2 analyze four additional (non-tax) policy outcomes: the minimum wage, 
welfare generosity, the number of government employees, and the wages of government 
employees. Under a Democratic Governor, the minimum wage is typically about 0.9% higher, 
which is approximately 2/3rds of a standard deviation.7 
                                                 
7 As Senator Edward Kennedy is reported to have said to Senator John Kerry in 1994: “If you're not for raising the 
minimum wage, you don't deserve to call yourself a Democrat.” (James 2004). 
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Using the log of the real maximum welfare amount for a family of four as the dependent 
variable, I find no significant partisan differences. The same is true for the log of the number of 
state employees, and the log of the average real wage of state employees. While Republicans’ 
rhetoric in gubernatorial contests often focuses on reducing the size of government, this does not 
appear to be borne out in policy outcomes. 
 
Intermediate Outcomes  
 
I now proceed to estimating a set of intermediate outcomes, which are affected by both policies 
and economic and social conditions: the unionization rate, incarceration and execution rates, 
welfare rolls, expenditure on transfers, income from taxation, and state revenue.  
 
The first row of Table 3 shows the relationship between partisanship and the unionization rate. 
Although the Democrats are strongly allied to the union movement, unions do not appear to fare 
better under a state Democratic governor. The next rows indicate that incarceration rates are 
about 1/10th of a standard deviation lower under a Democratic Governor (although this finding is 
not robust to all specifications), while execution rates are unrelated to partisanship. For the most 
part, the parties are similarly “tough on crime.”8 While gubernatorial partisanship is unrelated to 
unemployment insurance receipt and transfer payments, the welfare caseload is approximately 1-
2% higher under a Democratic Governor.  
 
                                                 
8 Of course, it could be that partisanship has effects on both crime and criminal justice policies that offset one 
another. But this is unlikely to be the case, given the finding below that crime rates are not significantly correlated 
with partisanship. 
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Table 3: Intermediate Outcomes – Unionization, Incarceration and Welfare Caseload 
Each cell is from a separate regression, and represents the marginal effect of having a 
Democratic Governor on various dependent variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent Variable 
Unionization rate -0.3078 -0.2765 -0.33 -0.348 -0.2774 
 [0.2351] [0.2390] [0.2399] [0.2411] [0.2946] 
Incarceration rate -8.4465 -10.0978 -12.7136** -12.3466** -11.1447 
 [7.0708] [6.5177] [6.1303] [5.9103] [7.9616] 
Execution rate 0.0013 -0.0033 -0.0031 0.0031 0.002 
 [0.0043] [0.0044] [0.0042] [0.0044] [0.0070] 
State expenditure on 
unemployment 
insurance 0.0037 0.0152 0.0155 0.0135 -0.0005 
 [0.0246] [0.0247] [0.0243] [0.0242] [0.0336] 
State transfer 
payments per capita -0.0214 -0.0068 -0.01 -0.006 0.0165 
 [0.0301] [0.0284] [0.0288] [0.0289] [0.0315] 
Fraction of state 
population on 
welfare 0.1539 0.1582 0.1867* 0.1865* 0.1058 
 [0.1054] [0.0949] [0.0998] [0.1031] [0.1199] 
State and year FE Y Y Y Y Y 
State demographics  Y Y Y Y 
Legislative control   Y Y Y 
Voter ideology    Y Y 
Democratic 
voteshare 
    Y 
Notes:  
1. Robust standard errors, clustered at the state level, in brackets. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 
the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
2. Demographic controls are the log of the state population, and the fraction of the state’s population that is under 
15, over 65, and African-American.  
3. Legislative controls are indicator variables for the Democrats having a majority in both houses, and the 
Republicans having a majority in both houses. 
4. Voter ideology is the average Poole-Rosenthal score of the state’s delegation to the federal House of 
Representatives in the most recent election. 
5. Democratic voteshare is a linear control in the democratic candidate’s share of the gubernatorial vote. In this 
specification, non-competitive elections (those in which one candidate won more than 80% of the vote) are 
dropped. 
 
Table 4 shows four “tax and spend” variables: income tax receipts, other tax receipts (mostly 
company tax), non-tax governmental income (license fees), and total state government revenue. 
Almost none are significantly correlated with gubernatorial partisanship, though in the regression 
discontinuity specification, state revenues are lower under Democratic governors (significant 
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only at the 10% level). Consistent with Alt and Lowry (2000), the coefficient on legislative 
partisanship is significant in the total revenue regressions (see Leigh 2007 for details). The 
partisan effects for all tax and spend variables appear to be confined to legislatures – taxation and 
spending policies do not appear to differ significantly between Republican and Democratic 
governors. 
 
Table 4: Intermediate Outcomes – Tax and Spend 
Each cell is from a separate regression, and represents the marginal effect of having a 
Democratic Governor on various dependent variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent Variable 
State income tax 
receipts per capita -0.0528 -0.0253 -0.0111 -0.0082 -0.0899 
 [0.0414] [0.0401] [0.0409] [0.0412] [0.0651] 
State other tax 
receipts per capita 0.0095 0.0271 0.0286 0.0275 0.0620 
 [0.0313] [0.0299] [0.0293] [0.0290] [0.0380] 
State non-tax income 
per capita 0.0078 0.0227 0.0224 0.0231 0.0171 
 [0.0358] [0.0344] [0.0354] [0.0340] [0.0333] 
State revenue per 
capita -0.0362 -0.0211 -0.0158 -0.0137 -0.0706* 
 [0.0356] [0.0338] [0.0323] [0.0317] [0.0395] 
State and year FE Y Y Y Y Y 
State demographics  Y Y Y Y 
Legislative control   Y Y Y 
Voter ideology    Y Y 
Democratic 
voteshare 
    Y 
Notes: As for Table 3. 
 
Social Welfare Measures 
 
The last set of dependent variables are pure social welfare measures: income, wages, 
unemployment, poverty, inequality and crime rates. With the possible exception of inequality, 
there is a broad consensus across the two parties about the importance of achieving these goals. 
However, the parties differ in the prominence that they give to these goals, with Republicans 
tending to put greater emphasis on crime and growth, and Democrats tending to put greater 
emphasis on poverty and unemployment. To the extent that politics involves allocating resources 
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from less favored to more favored projects, partisan differences in policy preferences could still 
reveal themselves in these social welfare measures.  
 
To begin with, I calculate measures of mean and median family income. Since these figures are 
not publicly available at a state level, I use microdata from the 1963-2003 Current Population 
Surveys, and calculate the equivalized family income for each individual by dividing total family 
income by the square root of the number of family members. The first set of outcomes in Table 5 
estimate the effect of partisanship on mean pre-tax and post-tax family income, median pre-tax 
and post-tax family income, and real wages. While the first three of these are small and 
insignificant, median post-tax family income is about 1% higher under a Democratic Governor 
(though this is not significant in all specifications). The coefficient on real wages is negative, but 
not statistically significant. Poverty rates and pre-tax inequality are not statistically related to 
partisanship, but most specifications suggest that post-tax inequality is about 1/3rd of a gini point 
lower under a Democratic Governor – providing some evidence in favor of the theory that the 
defining difference between left and right is the parties’ attitude to inequality (Bobbio 1996). 
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Table 5: Social Welfare Measures – Income and Income Distribution 
Each cell is from a separate regression, and represents the marginal effect of having a 
Democratic Governor on various dependent variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent Variable 
Mean real family 
income (pre-tax) -0.0027 -0.0018 -0.0028 -0.003 0.0042 
 [0.0075] [0.0073] [0.0072] [0.0075] [0.0103] 
Mean real family 
income (post-tax) 0.0052 0.0055 0.0045 0.0039 0.008 
 [0.0061] [0.0053] [0.0053] [0.0054] [0.0091] 
Median real family 
income (pre-tax) -0.0008 0.0014 0.0006 0.0008 0.0042 
 [0.0078] [0.0074] [0.0073] [0.0076] [0.0108] 
Median real family 
income (post-tax) 0.0096 0.0109* 0.0107* 0.0109* 0.0115 
 [0.0069] [0.0062] [0.0062] [0.0065] [0.0102] 
Mean real wage -0.0077 -0.0077 -0.0089 -0.0098 -0.0079 
 [0.0148] [0.0135] [0.0134] [0.0143] [0.0130] 
Proportion below 
poverty line 0.0264 -0.131 -0.1071 -0.1006 -0.6038 
 [0.6473] [0.5718] [0.5730] [0.5667] [0.7019] 
Gini (pre-tax) 0.0054 -0.0646 -0.0756 -0.0995 -0.0947 
 [0.1563] [0.1438] [0.1467] [0.1439] [0.2037] 
Gini (post-tax) -0.2158 -0.2951* -0.3082* -0.3459* -0.2844 
 [0.1765] [0.1615] [0.1666] [0.1751] [0.2152] 
State and year FE Y Y Y Y Y 
State demographics  Y Y Y Y 
Legislative control   Y Y Y 
Voter ideology    Y Y 
Democratic 
voteshare 
    Y 
Notes: As for Table 3. 
 
Measures of work, education, crime and suicide are shown in Table 6. Only one of these impacts 
is significant: in the regression discontinuity specification, the unemployment rate is 0.2–0.3 
percentage points lower under a Democratic Governor. Test scores, property crime, violent 
crime, murder and suicide are not significantly related to partisanship. While this could 
potentially be due to reporting differences in the case of property crime and violent crime, this is 
much less likely in the case of murder and suicide, which are almost always reported. Overall, 
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given that Republicans are often typified as being “tougher” on crime than Democrats, it is 
interesting to find no systemic partisan difference in crime rates. 
 
 
Table 6: Social Welfare Measures – Work, Education, Crime and Suicide 
Each cell is from a separate regression, and represents the marginal effect of having a 
Democratic Governor on various dependent variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent Variable 
Unemployment rate -0.1846 -0.176 -0.1635 -0.1727 -0.2895* 
 [0.1160] [0.1208] [0.1285] [0.1321] [0.1673] 
Test scores (4th 
grade reading) 0.3775 0.2828 0.288 0.2575 0.6204 
 [0.4577] [0.4346] [0.4356] [0.4342] [0.6302] 
Property crime rate -64.938 -61.0956 -56.7582 -54.6538 56.512 
 [42.1713] [37.0688] [37.3019] [37.3852] [57.8357] 
Violent crime rate -6.6894 -10.0581 -10.3618 -9.9462 -5.9597 
 [10.9497] [10.5230] [10.2501] [10.0503] [11.1345] 
Murder rate -0.0790 -0.1018 -0.0679 -0.0819 -0.0408 
 [0.1511] [0.1372] [0.1335] [0.1343] [0.1508] 
Suicide rate -0.2432 -0.1579 -0.1356 -0.1163 -0.1403 
 [0.1473] [0.1387] [0.1353] [0.1333] [0.2115] 
Log population 0.0036 -0.0044 -0.0018 -0.0069 0.0135 
 [0.0102] [0.0099] [0.0098] [0.0088] [0.0124] 
State and year FE Y Y Y Y Y 
State demographics  Y Y Y Y 
Legislative control   Y Y Y 
Voter ideology    Y Y 
Democratic 
voteshare 
    Y 
Notes: As for Table 3. 
 
Robustness Checks 
 
Could it be that policymakers are stymied by large offsetting interstate migration flows? In the 
context of progressive taxation, Feldstein and Wrobel (1998) argue that migration prevents state 
policymakers from redistributing income. However, Chernick (2004) and Leigh (2005) have 
found evidence to the contrary. Similarly, looking at a broader range of policies, Wu, Perloff and 
Golan (2002) conclude that progressive taxes and the Earned Income Tax Credit reduce 
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inequality within a state, while raising the minimum wage increases state inequality.9 One way of 
testing this is to see whether the election of Democrats or Republicans is systematically 
associated with population flows. This theory is tested in the final row of Table 6, which show 
small and insignificant relationships between partisanship and the size of a state’s population. 
The absence of a statistically significant relationship lends weight to the interpretation that it is 
convergent preferences rather than an inability to affect outcomes that explains these results. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
At a state level, the party in power makes little difference to most policy settings. Democratic 
Governors tend to prefer slightly higher minimum wages. Under Republican Governors, 
incarceration rates are higher, while welfare caseloads are higher under Democratic Governors. 
In terms of social welfare, Democratic Governors tend to preside over higher median post-tax 
income, lower post-tax inequality, and lower unemployment rates.  
 
There are many areas in which gubernatorial partisanship does not appear to have an impact on 
policy outcomes and social welfare. I find no evidence of gubernatorial partisan differences in 
tax rates, welfare generosity, the number of government employees or their salaries, state 
revenue, incarceration rates, execution rates, pre-tax incomes and inequality, crime rates, suicide 
rates, and test scores. These findings are broadly consistent with those in the existing literature.10  
 
Another factor to bear in mind is that the above results carry out significance tests separately for 
each dependent variable. A cautious reader might be concerned that raising the number of 
dependent variables also increases the probability that one or more will be statistically significant 
                                                 
9 Wu, Perloff and Golan (2002) do not distinguish between state and federal policies (since their models do not 
include year dummies). 
10 Studies that have found various dependent variables to be unrelated to gubernatorial partisanship include Besley 
and Case (2003), who do not find a significant relationship between gubernatorial partisanship and total state 
spending per capita, or between gubernatorial partisanship and family assistance per capita. Similarly, Dilger (1998) 
found no significant impact of gubernatorial partisanship on eight of his nine state government spending and tax 
policies. Findings on the effect of gubernatorial partisanship and the state tax burden have arrived at different 
conclusions. Besley and Case (1995) report that the governor’s political party is not significantly related to the level 
of total taxes (except in the governor’s last term). Reed (2006) reaches a similar conclusion. By contrast, Besley and 
Case (2003) find that under a Democratic governor, taxes are lower, but this finding is only significant at the 10% 
level. This difference in statistical significance can be explained by the fact that Besley and Case (2003) do not use 
cluster-robust standard errors, opting instead to treat each state-year observation as independent from the next. 
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at conventional levels (eg. when testing 20 hypotheses, mere chance would imply that one of 
these would be significant at the 5 percent level). Two straightforward ways to take account of 
this are to implement a Bonferroni adjustment, in which the critical p-value when conducting k 
tests is p/k, or a Sidak adjustment, in which the critical p-value when conducting k tests is 
1-(1-p)(1/k). In the present case, this suggests that the Democratic Governor coefficient should 
only be regarded as significant at the 10 percent level if p<0.00313 (Bonferroni) or p<0.00329 
(Sidak). None of the Democratic Governor coefficients shown in this paper meet such stringent 
standards. 
 
Even without adjusting for simultaneous inference, very few policy settings and social welfare 
outcomes tested here appear to be statistically significant at conventional levels. Taking account 
of simultaneous inference, none are statistically significant. The absence of any significant 
relationship between population flows and gubernatorial partisanship suggests that cross-state 
migration is unlikely to be affecting the results. There are two possible interpretations of these 
results. One is that, for a broad range of outcomes, the policy preferences of Democrats and 
Republicans at a state level are largely similar. Another possibility is that partisanship matters at 
a legislative level, but not at a gubernatorial level. This would be consistent with the fact that the 
legislative coefficients are statistically significant for a larger number of outcomes than are the 
gubernatorial coefficients (see the appendix tables to Leigh 2007). It would also be consistent 
with the model proposed by Reed (2006), in which governors must appeal to the median voter in 
the state, and are therefore more centrist than legislators, who need only appeal to the median 
voter in their district.  
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Data Appendix 
 
Political Variables and Controls 
 
State political variables are from ICPSR. 1995. Candidate Name and Constituency Totals, 1788-
1990 (ICPSR No. 2), 5th ed. Ann Arbor, MI; updated using figures from the Congressional 
Quarterly database. 
 
Poole-Rosenthal scores are downloaded from Keith Poole’s website 
(http://voteview.com/dwnomin.htm, updated 10 December 2004). I drop all legislators except 
Democrats and Republicans, and use the first common space score, which has a potential range 
from -1 to 1, and which Poole and Rosenthal describe as picking up “liberal-conservative” in the 
modern era. For each state and election year, I calculate the mean score for legislators serving in 
the House of Representatives, and apply the same score to the following year, in which no 
election took place. 
 
The fraction of the population aged under 15, aged over 65, and who are African-American are 
calculated from the IPUMS samples of the decennial censuses, and interpolated for intervening 
years. After 2000, the figures from the 2000 census are used. 
 
Population figures are from Bureau of Economic Analysis 
(http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/regional/).  
 
Policy Settings 
 
Top income tax and corporate tax rates from the World Tax Database, at the Ross School of 
Business in the University of Michigan 
(http://www.bus.umich.edu/OTPR/otpr/introduction.htm). 
 
Tax redistributivity is the amount by which the income taxation system reduces the gini 
coefficient. This measure, and average taxation rates, reflect only the tax policies, since they are 
calculated using the method outlined in Leigh (2005). In brief, this involves taking a single 
sample of respondents from the March 1990 CPS, and adjusting the average income of the 
respondents so that it is the same as the average income in a given state and year. To simplify 
calculations, I assume that all family income is wage income, that individuals file as singles, and 
couples file jointly (with 2/3rds of the income assigned to the primary earner). Dependent 
exemptions and age exemptions are taken into account. Post-tax income is net of state and 
federal taxes, but not net of FICA, which is regarded as akin to savings. Since Taxsim only 
includes state taxes from 1977 onwards, earlier years are not included in the analysis. The tax 
burden is then calculated for each state and year. From this, it is possible to calculate the tax 
redistribution index and the average tax rate. These figures reflect only policy effects, and not 
behavioral responses. 
 
Minimum wage data from 1973 from Neumark, D and Nizalova, O. 2004. “Minimum Wage 
Effects in the Longer Run”. PPIC Working Paper No. 2004.03. Public Policy Institute of 
California: San Francisco, CA. 
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EITC supplement is the percentage added by the state to EITC payments for a family  with one 
child. Most data is from Johnson, N. 2001. “A Hand Up: How State Earned Income Tax Credits 
Help Working Families Escape Poverty in 2001”. Washington, DC: Center on Budget and Policy 
Priorities; updated with figures from Leigh, A. 2005. “Who Benefits from the Earned Income 
Tax Credit? Incidence Among Recipients, Coworkers and Firms”, mimeo. 
 
Maximum welfare amount is the log of the maximum real benefit for a family of 4 under the Aid 
to Families with Dependent Children program (AFDC), or the Temporary Assistance for Needy 
Families program (TANF).  AFDC/TANF caseload is the average annual caseload as a 
percentage of the total population. Both figures supplied by Robert Moffitt up to 1998; then 
updated using data from the Administration for Children and Families, Department of Family 
and Community Services (http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/programs/ofa/caseload/caseloadindex.htm). 
 
State employment and salaries from Bureau of Economic Analysis 
(http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/regional/). State employment is the fraction of the population 
employed in state and local government. 
 
Intermediate Outcomes 
 
Incarceration rate from the Bureau of Justice Statistics - Data Online 
(http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs). Incarceration rate is the number incarcerated in state prisons per 
100,000 people per year.  
 
Execution rates calculated from M.W. Espy and J.O. Smykla. 2004. Executions in the United 
States, 1608-2002: The Espy File, 4th ed (ICPSR No. 8451), ICPSR, Ann Arbor, MI. Variable is 
the execution rate per 100,000 people per year. 
 
Unionization rate is the percentage of each state's nonagricultural wage and salary employees 
who are union members.  Estimates are based on the 1983-2002 Current Population Survey 
(CPS) Outgoing Rotation Group (ORG) earnings files, the 1973-81 May CPS earnings files, and 
the BLS publication, Directory of National Unions and Employee Associations, for various 
years.  Details on data and methodology are provided in B.T. Hirsch, D.A. Macpherson, and 
W.G. Vroman, “Estimates of Union Density by State,” Monthly Labor Review, Vol. 124, No. 7, 
July 2001, pp. 51-55 (accompanying data online at http://www.trinity.edu/bhirsch). 
 
Transfers, unemployment insurance, state tax revenue, and overall state revenue from Bureau of 
Economic Analysis (http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/regional/). Transfers and state revenue are 
expressed as the log real amount per person in the state.  
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Social Welfare Measures 
 
Average income and inequality measures are calculated from the March Current Population 
Survey, using Stephen Jenkins’ “ineqdeco” Stata routine. Since the CPS asks households about 
earnings in the previous year, the 1963-2003 surveys provide data on household income from 
1962-2002. Family income is adjusted for family size by dividing by the square root of the 
family size, and data is weighted by person-weights. Family incomes that are less than 1/10th of 
the median, and more than 10 times the median, are recoded to those values. The year 1962 was 
dropped, since it contains a substantial number of unrealistically high incomes, suggesting 
potential coding problems. Although the CPS is designed to be representative at a state level, the 
person-weights that are provided are calculated based on national demographics, rather than state 
demographics. However, this is unlikely to make a substantial difference. Using the CPS for 
California, a state whose demographic composition is very different to the nation as a whole, 
Reed, Haber and Mameesh (1996, Appendix B) used census data to form new CPS weights for 
California, and found that it made virtually no difference to their estimates of state inequality. 
 
Post-tax income and post-tax inequality are calculated by using the NBER’s Taxsim program 
(Feenberg and Coutts 1995), treating income and exemptions in the same manner as outlined in 
the “Policy Settings” section above. Since Taxsim only covers 1977 onwards, our post-tax 
estimates are only for 1977-2002. 
 
Whether a family is below the poverty line is provided in the CPS files in later years, and were 
added for earlier years by Unicon. Using this information, I calculate poverty rates for each state 
and year. 
 
Unemployment rates are from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (http://data.bls.gov/). 
 
National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) scores are from 
http://www.nces.ed.gov/nationsreportcard/naepdata/. Fourth grade reading scores are used on the 
basis that they are available for more states and years than any other test. 
 
Property crime rate and violent crime rate from the Bureau of Justice Statistics - Data Online 
(http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs). Crime rates are the number of crimes committed per 100,000 
people per year. 
 
Suicide rates supplied by Betsey Stevenson and Justin Wolfers, as detailed in Stevenson and 
Wolfers (2006). Rate is the number of suicides per 100,000 people per year. 
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Appendix Table 1         
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dependent Variable: 
 Top income tax rate Top corporate tax rate 
Indicator: Democrat 
Governor -0.0376 -0.1841 -0.1937 -0.1936 0.0723 -0.0644 -0.0864 -0.1114 
 [0.1511] [0.1568] [0.1551] [0.1551] [0.1161] [0.1103] [0.1095] [0.1105] 
Log(Population)  -1.5469*** -1.3227*** -1.3268***  -1.1469*** -0.8671*** -0.8637*** 
  [0.2895] [0.2931] [0.3007]  [0.3046] [0.3226] [0.3221] 
Share of Population <15  12.2585* 9.6638 9.7074  14.4305** 11.5037** 12.5625** 
  [6.3285] [6.1525] [6.3065]  [5.6486] [5.6168] [5.6244] 
Share of Population >65  6.9266 5.8076 5.8522  27.3481*** 27.0613*** 29.4481*** 
  [8.6509] [8.5464] [8.5373]  [7.3063] [7.1413] [7.2473] 
Share of Population 
Black  11.5818*** 10.2221*** 10.2323***  18.4538*** 16.9511*** 17.2656*** 
  [3.1218] [3.1999] [3.1951]  [3.5288] [3.5031] [3.4980] 
Indicator: Democrats 
Control Both Houses   0.1851 0.1862   0.1999 0.174 
   [0.2167] [0.2216]   [0.1525] [0.1539] 
Indicator: Republicans 
Control Both Houses   -0.4458** -0.4474**   -0.5583*** -0.5056*** 
   [0.2154] [0.2209]   [0.1584] [0.1654] 
Poole-Rosenthal 
Ideology Score    0.0209    -0.0321 
    [0.4704]    [0.3515] 
Observations 2894 2846 2846 2846 2906 2906 2906 2893 
R-squared 0.79 0.8 0.81 0.81 0.77 0.79 0.8 0.8 
Note: Robust standard errors, clustered at the state*electoral term level, in brackets. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels 
respectively. All specifications include state and year fixed effects. 
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Appendix Table 2         
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dependent Variable: 
 Tax redistribution index Average income tax rate 
Indicator: Democrat 
Governor -0.0228** -0.0172* -0.0172* -0.0173* 0.0906 0.1217 0.106 0.1164 
 [0.0099] [0.0093] [0.0093] [0.0097] [0.0865] [0.0834] [0.0828] [0.0859] 
Log(Population)  -0.2446*** -0.2426*** -0.2459***  -1.7491*** -1.8250*** -1.8624*** 
  [0.0619] [0.0607] [0.0622]  [0.5932] [0.5895] [0.5997] 
Share of Population <15  -1.5760** -1.5103* -1.4624*  -11.2242 -11.8565* -11.974 
  [0.7960] [0.8020] [0.8232]  [6.9933] [7.1589] [7.3106] 
Share of Population >65  -4.0062*** -3.9130*** -3.7991***  -25.5850*** -26.9353*** -26.5324*** 
  [1.2199] [1.2390] [1.2759]  [8.6328] [8.6866] [9.4717] 
Share of Population 
Black  -5.0886*** -5.1025*** -5.1186***  -12.7108 -12.6452 -13.1111 
  [0.9393] [0.9266] [0.9301]  [8.5012] [8.3971] [8.4385] 
Indicator: Democrats 
Control Both Houses   0.0101 0.0112   -0.1643 -0.1392 
   [0.0131] [0.0137]   [0.1201] [0.1236] 
Indicator: Republicans 
Control Both Houses   -0.0249** -0.0243**   -0.1314 -0.1461 
   [0.0120] [0.0122]   [0.1155] [0.1173] 
Poole-Rosenthal 
Ideology Score    0.0168    0.1575 
    [0.0536]    [0.4733] 
Observations 1278 1278 1278 1265 1278 1278 1278 1265 
R-squared 0.93 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 
Note: Robust standard errors, clustered at the state*electoral term level, in brackets. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels 
respectively. All specifications include state and year fixed effects. 
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Appendix Table 3         
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dependent Variable: 
 Log real minimum wage Log maximum welfare benefit 
Indicator: Democrat 
Governor 0.0092** 0.0091** 0.0089** 0.0085** 0.0012 -0.0013 0.0003 0.0004 
 [0.0041] [0.0040] [0.0040] [0.0042] [0.0105] [0.0103] [0.0103] [0.0105] 
Log(Population)  0.017 0.0179 0.0196  0.2270*** 0.2479*** 0.2499*** 
  [0.0236] [0.0235] [0.0245]  [0.0400] [0.0405] [0.0420] 
Share of Population <15  0.7233* 0.7286* 0.7452*  -2.2291*** -2.1132*** -2.0863*** 
  [0.3731] [0.3897] [0.3948]  [0.7210] [0.7151] [0.7165] 
Share of Population >65  -0.0056 -0.0002 -0.0032  -1.8263** -1.5442* -1.4357* 
  [0.5959] [0.6306] [0.6575]  [0.8649] [0.8574] [0.8587] 
Share of Population 
Black  -0.1582 -0.167 -0.1537  0.2272 0.1236 0.1423 
  [0.2981] [0.2985] [0.2968]  [0.4725] [0.4746] [0.4758] 
Indicator: Democrats 
Control Both Houses   0.0004 -0.0006   0.0426*** 0.0441*** 
   [0.0067] [0.0069]   [0.0143] [0.0148] 
Indicator: Republicans 
Control Both Houses   -0.0042 -0.003   -0.0215 -0.0183 
   [0.0066] [0.0068]   [0.0139] [0.0144] 
Poole-Rosenthal 
Ideology Score    -0.0082    -0.0117 
    [0.0137]    [0.0400] 
Observations 1428 1428 1428 1416 1806 1806 1806 1793 
R-squared 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 
Note: Robust standard errors, clustered at the state*electoral term level, in brackets. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels 
respectively. All specifications include state and year fixed effects. 
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Appendix Table 4         
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dependent Variable: 
 State and local employees as a percentage of the population Log average real wage of a state or local employee 
Indicator: Democrat 
Governor -0.0202 0.0055 0.0065 0.006 -0.0033 -0.0042 -0.0053 -0.0065 
 [0.0294] [0.0238] [0.0238] [0.0242] [0.0051] [0.0051] [0.0052] [0.0053] 
Log(Population)  -1.2411*** -1.2314*** -1.2598***  0.0243 0.0216 0.0176 
  [0.1624] [0.1628] [0.1647]  [0.0214] [0.0207] [0.0212] 
Share of Population <15  -15.8003*** -15.6812*** -15.6720***  1.1440*** 1.0722*** 1.1254*** 
  [2.3053] [2.3105] [2.3046]  [0.3685] [0.3642] [0.3654] 
Share of Population >65  -11.4922*** -11.2866*** -11.1132***  -0.1474 -0.2788 -0.1009 
  [2.8700] [2.9005] [3.0130]  [0.4273] [0.4246] [0.4354] 
Share of Population 
Black  -8.6104*** -8.6753*** -8.7077***  0.4578 0.4794* 0.5211* 
  [1.4587] [1.4653] [1.4708]  [0.2821] [0.2777] [0.2785] 
Indicator: Democrats 
Control Both Houses   0.0265 0.0276   -0.0160** -0.0173*** 
   [0.0335] [0.0343]   [0.0063] [0.0065] 
Indicator: Republicans 
Control Both Houses   -0.0082 -0.0185   -0.0052 -0.0035 
   [0.0346] [0.0337]   [0.0085] [0.0086] 
Poole-Rosenthal 
Ideology Score    0.1356    0.0173 
    [0.1504]    [0.0192] 
Observations 1622 1622 1622 1610 1622 1622 1622 1610 
R-squared 0.9 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 
Note: Robust standard errors, clustered at the state*electoral term level, in brackets. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels 
respectively. All specifications include state and year fixed effects. 
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Appendix Table 5           
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Dependent Variable: 
 Unionization Rate (%) Incarceration rate (per 100,000 people) 
Indicator: Democrat 
Governor -0.3078 -0.2765 -0.33 -0.2755 -0.2774 -8.4465 -10.0978* -12.7136** -9.4797 -11.1447 
 [0.2139] [0.2120] [0.2099] [0.3065] [0.3081] [5.7933] [5.5878] [5.6528] [8.2232] [8.2858] 
Log(Population)  1.3983 1.4566 1.508 1.5899  81.2486** 72.2756* 78.4254** 68.173 
  [0.9973] [0.9936] [0.9831] [1.0074]  [39.9967] [38.5569] [39.1174] [41.5638] 
Share of Pop. <15  -35.0383** -36.3550** -30.8253** -30.1844** 206.8321 90.1136 241.5415 173.9201  
  [14.4926] [14.2074] [14.2989] [14.4408]  [572.2214] [563.0646] [561.9966] [568.3185] 
Share of Pop. >65  -35.4113** -38.7677** -38.1047** -36.2170** 648.3605 331.2322 312.8164 364.2956  
  [17.1144] [16.7094] [16.5859] [16.8345]  [666.1778] [678.8677] [690.3713] [732.3280] 
Share of Pop. Black  -19.6691 -20.1747 -12.5337 -11.5906  526.4523 542.369 538.7245 470.7837 
  [12.3993] [12.2974] [12.4346] [12.4276]  [793.3108] [775.7711] [727.1693] [722.1319] 
Indicator: 
Democrats Control 
Both Houses   -0.5435* -0.5274* -0.5670*   -24.499*** -25.892*** -24.509*** 
   [0.2998] [0.2992] [0.3035]   [8.6397] [8.8707] [8.8982] 
Indicator: 
Republicans Control 
Both Houses   -0.8671*** -0.8412*** -0.7650**   -8.4426 -7.8795 -10.0464 
   [0.3156] [0.3146] [0.3262]   [8.4720] [8.5211] [8.5710] 
Poole-Rosenthal 
Ideology Score    -0.2566 -0.3903    -17.6451 -4.1761 
    [1.3352] [1.3626]    [40.5850] [41.9575] 
Democratic 
Voteshare     -0.3389     43.7614* 
     [0.6876]     [23.9104] 
Observations 1391 1391 1391 1352 1345 805 805 805 786 781 
R-squared 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.89 0.89 0.9 0.9 0.9 
Note: Robust standard errors, clustered at the state*electoral term level, in brackets. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels 
respectively. All specifications include state and year fixed effects. 
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Appendix Table 6           
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Dependent Variable: 
 Number of executions per 100,000 people Log state and local transfers per capita 
Indicator: Democrat 
Governor 0.0013 -0.0033 -0.0031 -0.0068 0.002 -0.0214 -0.0068 -0.01 0.0201 0.0165 
 [0.0056] [0.0052] [0.0051] [0.0064] [0.0052] [0.0226] [0.0220] [0.0224] [0.0321] [0.0323] 
Log(Population)  -0.1410*** -0.1459*** -0.1589*** -0.1288***  -0.3607*** -0.3537*** -0.3559*** -0.3595*** 
  [0.0255] [0.0258] [0.0271] [0.0297]  [0.0915] [0.0933] [0.0937] [0.0956] 
Share of Pop. <15  1.2328*** 1.2539*** 1.2237*** 1.0500***  -0.822 -0.9134 0.0909 -0.0941 
  [0.2709] [0.2724] [0.2874] [0.3042]  [1.6731] [1.6619] [1.6818] [1.7007] 
Share of Pop. >65  0.8792** 0.8412** 0.4718 0.6833*  -1.0436 -1.2573 -0.7938 -1.2723 
  [0.3802] [0.3748] [0.3657] [0.3915]  [2.2738] [2.2755] [2.2366] [2.2916] 
Share of Pop. Black  0.2086 0.2025 -0.4838** -0.4327**  -4.7002*** -4.7614*** -3.5588*** -3.7154*** 
  [0.1645] [0.1637] [0.2092] [0.1920]  [1.1477] [1.1584] [1.2619] [1.2660] 
Indicator: 
Democrats Control 
Both Houses   -0.0177** -0.0196*** -0.0201***   -0.0354 -0.037 -0.0345 
   [0.0075] [0.0072] [0.0065]   [0.0338] [0.0338] [0.0343] 
Indicator: 
Republicans Control 
Both Houses   0.0058 0.0016 -0.0034   -0.0526 -0.0471 -0.0586 
   [0.0070] [0.0071] [0.0059]   [0.0408] [0.0404] [0.0411] 
Poole-Rosenthal 
Ideology Score    0.0279 0.0064    -0.203 -0.1577 
    [0.0326] [0.0305]    [0.1680] [0.1712] 
Democratic 
Voteshare     0.0027     0.0238 
     [0.0184]     [0.0948] 
Observations 2601 2423 2423 2203 1999 1491 1491 1491 1430 1424 
R-squared 0.34 0.43 0.43 0.4 0.35 0.92 0.93 0.93 0.92 0.92 
Note: Robust standard errors, clustered at the state*electoral term level, in brackets. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels 
respectively. All specifications include state and year fixed effects. 
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Appendix Table 7           
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Dependent Variable: 
 Log state UI payments per capita Proportion of population receiving welfare (%) 
Indicator: Democrat 
Governor 0.0037 0.0152 0.0155 0.0019 -0.0005 0.1539* 0.1582** 0.1867** 0.1154 0.1058 
 [0.0230] [0.0230] [0.0231] [0.0342] [0.0345] [0.0818] [0.0781] [0.0806] [0.1157] [0.1176] 
Log(Population)  -0.2116*** -0.2169*** -0.2113** -0.2318***  1.8646*** 1.9862*** 1.9294*** 1.8916*** 
  [0.0809] [0.0833] [0.0848] [0.0869]  [0.4483] [0.4500] [0.4484] [0.4588] 
Share of Pop. <15  1.4536 1.4714 1.5415 1.7194  3.2864 4.44 3.9799 4.0005 
  [1.4356] [1.4343] [1.4728] [1.4717]  [6.6812] [6.7451] [6.8728] [6.9862] 
Share of Pop. >65  -0.3998 -0.3895 -0.2523 0.0834  -15.4310* -12.6629 -12.1396 -11.9293 
  [1.5815] [1.5944] [1.6228] [1.6636]  [8.7076] [8.5818] [8.6354] [8.9122] 
Share of Pop. Black 
 -4.9607*** -4.9339*** -4.8274*** -4.8095***  
-
27.8477*** 
-
28.0850*** 
-
31.4951*** 
-
31.7689*** 
  [0.8145] [0.8205] [0.9904] [0.9981]  [7.6013] [7.5332] [7.9583] [8.0248] 
Indicator: 
Democrats Control 
Both Houses   0.0008 0.0048 0.0081   0.3146*** 0.3223*** 0.3271*** 
   [0.0308] [0.0313] [0.0320]   [0.1153] [0.1159] [0.1198] 
Indicator: 
Republicans Control 
Both Houses   0.0138 0.0153 0.0125   -0.0459 -0.0405 -0.0546 
   [0.0296] [0.0299] [0.0307]   [0.1235] [0.1226] [0.1243] 
Poole-Rosenthal 
Ideology Score    0.1075 0.1099    0.4281 0.4976 
    [0.1713] [0.1757]    [0.4790] [0.4923] 
Democratic 
Voteshare     0.0903     0.2239 
     [0.0898]     [0.3076] 
Observations 1491 1491 1491 1430 1424 994 994 994 973 966 
R-squared 0.84 0.85 0.85 0.84 0.84 0.83 0.84 0.85 0.85 0.85 
Note: Robust standard errors, clustered at the state*electoral term level, in brackets. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels 
respectively. All specifications include state and year fixed effects. 
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Appendix Table 8           
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Dependent Variable: 
 Log real state income tax receipts per capita Log real other state tax receipts per capita 
Indicator: Democrat 
Governor -0.0528 -0.0253 -0.0111 -0.0863 -0.0899 0.0095 0.0271 0.0286 0.0622* 0.0620* 
 [0.0541] [0.0537] [0.0518] [0.0780] [0.0796] [0.0250] [0.0226] [0.0225] [0.0347] [0.0347] 
Log(Population)  -1.4279*** -1.4411*** -1.4615*** -1.4651***  -0.9559*** -0.9972*** -1.0166*** -1.0388*** 
  [0.4235] [0.4226] [0.4314] [0.4239]  [0.0951] [0.0924] [0.0902] [0.0904] 
Share of Pop. <15  7.8418* 8.1788* 9.1512* 9.0388*  -7.5605*** -7.4447*** -6.1374*** -5.9195*** 
  [4.6384] [4.6446] [4.8835] [4.9013]  [1.5958] [1.5645] [1.5190] [1.5201] 
Share of Pop. >65  10.1094** 11.3975** 12.5084** 12.2903**  1.1364 1.1481 2.1817 2.5437 
  [4.7460] [4.8472] [4.9971] [5.1069]  [2.1268] [2.0837] [2.0641] [2.1288] 
Share of Pop. Black  -6.6569*** -6.5088*** -6.6709*** -6.7600***  1.3065 1.5063 2.8582** 2.9000** 
  [1.8829] [1.8563] [2.2803] [2.2828]  [1.1659] [1.1591] [1.2944] [1.2891] 
Indicator: 
Democrats Control 
Both Houses   0.1551 0.1616* 0.1683*   -0.0057 -0.0056 -0.0055 
   [0.0953] [0.0968] [0.0999]   [0.0296] [0.0291] [0.0292] 
Indicator: 
Republicans Control 
Both Houses   0.1415* 0.1548** 0.1487*   0.0960*** 0.1035*** 0.1007*** 
   [0.0763] [0.0784] [0.0810]   [0.0310] [0.0311] [0.0318] 
Poole-Rosenthal 
Ideology Score    0.4767 0.5226    -0.2199 -0.235 
    [0.3331] [0.3419]    [0.1878] [0.1908] 
Democratic 
Voteshare     0.0236     0.0957 
     [0.2174]     [0.0866] 
Observations 1239 1239 1239 1180 1174 1491 1491 1491 1430 1424 
R-squared 0.77 0.79 0.79 0.78 0.78 0.9 0.92 0.92 0.93 0.93 
Note: Robust standard errors, clustered at the state*electoral term level, in brackets. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels 
respectively. All specifications include state and year fixed effects. 
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Appendix Table 9           
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Dependent Variable: 
 Log real state non-tax revenue per capita Log real state revenue per capita 
Indicator: Democrat 
Governor 0.0078 0.0227 0.0224 0.0281 0.0171 -0.0362 -0.0211 -0.0158 -0.0654 -0.0706 
 [0.0271] [0.0257] [0.0260] [0.0359] [0.0359] [0.0335] [0.0320] [0.0315] [0.0479] [0.0487] 
Log(Population)  -0.6505*** -0.6717*** -0.6790*** -0.7236***  -1.0948*** -1.0422*** -1.0112*** -1.0272*** 
  [0.0891] [0.0915] [0.0939] [0.0974]  [0.1323] [0.1303] [0.1317] [0.1300] 
Share of Pop. <15  -6.5536*** -6.5205*** -5.4239*** -5.4675***  2.3073 2.3321 3.3913 3.3041 
  [1.7755] [1.7707] [1.7628] [1.7731]  [2.2107] [2.2009] [2.2649] [2.2751] 
Share of Pop. >65  -8.0918*** -8.1632*** -7.4650*** -7.8689***  3.6273 4.1195 4.6494* 4.354 
  [2.0762] [2.0589] [2.0605] [2.0782]  [2.6282] [2.6390] [2.6627] [2.7057] 
Share of Pop. Black  -1.8839* -1.7915* -1.3161 -1.5866  0.4931 0.3048 0.9738 0.8176 
  [0.9889] [0.9879] [1.1088] [1.1086]  [1.2166] [1.1946] [1.4693] [1.4680] 
Indicator: 
Democrats Control 
Both Houses   -0.0163 -0.019 -0.0111   0.0945** 0.0917** 0.0973** 
   [0.0306] [0.0309] [0.0308]   [0.0417] [0.0419] [0.0426] 
Indicator: 
Republicans Control 
Both Houses   0.0359 0.0391 0.0105   -0.0351 -0.0255 -0.039 
   [0.0348] [0.0346] [0.0347]   [0.0483] [0.0483] [0.0497] 
Poole-Rosenthal 
Ideology Score    -0.0325 0.0493    0.3077 0.3588 
    [0.1927] [0.1944]    [0.2367] [0.2414] 
Democratic 
Voteshare     0.2116**     0.0792 
     [0.0878]     [0.1150] 
Observations 1491 1491 1491 1430 1424 1491 1491 1491 1430 1424 
R-squared 0.9 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.87 0.89 0.89 0.88 0.88 
Note: Robust standard errors, clustered at the state*electoral term level, in brackets. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels 
respectively. All specifications include state and year fixed effects. 
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Appendix Table 10           
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Dependent Variable: 
 Log real mean family income (pre-tax) Log real mean family income (post-tax) 
Indicator: Democrat 
Governor -0.0027 -0.0018 -0.0028 -0.003 0.0042 0.0052 0.0055 0.0045 0.0039 0.008 
 [0.0059] [0.0059] [0.0059] [0.0060] [0.0091] [0.0046] [0.0045] [0.0046] [0.0048] [0.0070] 
Log(Population)  -0.0124 -0.0162 -0.0065 -0.0001  0.0472* 0.0429 0.0456 0.0507* 
  [0.0401] [0.0408] [0.0417] [0.0422]  [0.0277] [0.0279] [0.0285] [0.0287] 
Share of Pop. <15  -1.5228*** -1.5643*** -1.5831*** -1.5150***  0.1222 0.0898 0.1018 0.0483 
  [0.4466] [0.4462] [0.4407] [0.4492]  [0.4650] [0.4657] [0.4703] [0.4772] 
Share of Pop. >65  -1.7386*** -1.8349*** -1.8460*** -1.8285***  -2.1947*** -2.2701*** -2.2675*** -2.3962*** 
  [0.5258] [0.5307] [0.5179] [0.5236]  [0.5365] [0.5313] [0.5485] [0.5423] 
Share of Pop. Black  -0.1032 -0.0903 -0.0471 0.2005  1.1931** 1.2028** 1.2399** 1.3288** 
  [0.3874] [0.3899] [0.3890] [0.4104]  [0.5394] [0.5366] [0.5378] [0.5547] 
Indicator: 
Democrats Control 
Both Houses   -0.0152* -0.0158* -0.0167*   -0.0099 -0.0103 -0.0104 
   [0.0088] [0.0090] [0.0090]   [0.0069] [0.0071] [0.0072] 
Indicator: 
Republicans Control 
Both Houses   -0.0045 -0.0006 -0.0012   -0.0011 -0.0001 -0.0004 
   [0.0092] [0.0088] [0.0087]   [0.0069] [0.0069] [0.0070] 
Poole-Rosenthal 
Ideology Score    -0.0382 -0.0395    -0.0128 -0.0146 
    [0.0311] [0.0313]    [0.0235] [0.0235] 
Democratic 
Voteshare     -0.0533     -0.0261 
     [0.0447]     [0.0349] 
Observations 1404 1404 1404 1397 1356 948 948 948 941 922 
R-squared 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.91 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 
Note: Robust standard errors, clustered at the state*electoral term level, in brackets. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels 
respectively. All specifications include state and year fixed effects. 
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Appendix Table 11           
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Dependent Variable: 
 Log real median family income (pre-tax) Log real median family income (post-tax) 
Indicator: Democrat 
Governor -0.0008 0.0014 0.0006 0.0008 0.0042 0.0096* 0.0109** 0.0107** 0.0109** 0.0115 
 [0.0064] [0.0063] [0.0064] [0.0064] [0.0098] [0.0054] [0.0052] [0.0054] [0.0055] [0.0080] 
Log(Population)  -0.0557 -0.0591 -0.0463 -0.0373  0.0014 0.0008 0.0048 0.0083 
  [0.0402] [0.0407] [0.0402] [0.0408]  [0.0322] [0.0322] [0.0329] [0.0336] 
Share of Pop. <15  -2.2387*** -2.2717*** -2.3011*** -2.2455***  -0.3211 -0.3339 -0.3279 -0.4094 
  [0.4997] [0.5004] [0.4941] [0.4977]  [0.5199] [0.5211] [0.5265] [0.5401] 
Share of Pop. >65  -2.3717*** -2.4481*** -2.4633*** -2.4518***  -2.6183*** -2.6411*** -2.6263*** -2.7225*** 
  [0.6238] [0.6267] [0.6015] [0.6049]  [0.5949] [0.5899] [0.6123] [0.6192] 
Share of Pop. Black  -0.3903 -0.3777 -0.3257 -0.075  0.5755 0.5827 0.6305 0.7702 
  [0.4663] [0.4698] [0.4656] [0.4810]  [0.5637] [0.5622] [0.5611] [0.5815] 
Indicator: 
Democrats Control 
Both Houses   -0.012 -0.0116 -0.0121   -0.003 -0.0016 -0.0011 
   [0.0092] [0.0095] [0.0095]   [0.0082] [0.0084] [0.0085] 
Indicator: 
Republicans Control 
Both Houses   -0.0022 0.003 0.0022   0.006 0.0074 0.0071 
   [0.0102] [0.0096] [0.0096]   [0.0087] [0.0088] [0.0089] 
Poole-Rosenthal 
Ideology Score    -0.0506 -0.0529    -0.02 -0.0205 
    [0.0363] [0.0367]    [0.0249] [0.0250] 
Democratic 
Voteshare     -0.0301     -0.005 
     [0.0462]     [0.0391] 
Observations 1404 1404 1404 1397 1356 948 948 948 941 922 
R-squared 0.83 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.83 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.88 0.88 
Note: Robust standard errors, clustered at the state*electoral term level, in brackets. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels 
respectively. All specifications include state and year fixed effects. 
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Appendix Table 12           
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Dependent Variable: 
 Log mean real wage Fraction below the poverty line (%) 
Indicator: Democrat 
Governor -0.0077 -0.0077 -0.0089 -0.0098 -0.0079 0.0264 -0.131 -0.1071 -0.1006 -0.6038 
 [0.0086] [0.0082] [0.0082] [0.0086] [0.0119] [0.5098] [0.4809] [0.4852] [0.4842] [0.6986] 
Log(Population)  0.0032 -0.0009 0 -0.0066  -8.4228*** -7.9060*** -7.2784*** -7.5793*** 
  [0.0466] [0.0451] [0.0475] [0.0479]  [2.2997] [2.2912] [2.2921] [2.3756] 
Share of Pop. <15 
 0.9572* 0.9446 0.9858 1.1136*  
115.8436**
* 
117.9825**
* 
116.2488**
* 
109.9090**
* 
  [0.5713] [0.5859] [0.5993] [0.6067]  [32.7836] [32.6580] [32.9130] [32.8778] 
Share of Pop. >65  -4.5219*** -4.5963*** -4.5454*** -4.3964***  120.0585** 124.9849** 122.4630** 117.2538** 
  [0.6962] [0.7122] [0.7330] [0.7349]  [48.4690] [48.8707] [50.6929] [51.3720] 
Share of Pop. Black 
 2.7612*** 2.7541*** 2.7880*** 3.0367***  
145.4257**
* 
142.6340**
* 
145.0635**
* 
133.8573**
* 
  [0.7644] [0.7508] [0.7531] [0.7829]  [34.0883] [33.9717] [34.2021] [35.4002] 
Indicator: 
Democrats Control 
Both Houses   -0.0078 -0.0089 -0.0097   0.7405 0.6933 0.7561 
   [0.0081] [0.0083] [0.0084]   [0.7832] [0.8024] [0.8077] 
Indicator: 
Republicans Control 
Both Houses   -0.0234* -0.0219* -0.0220*   -1.0178 -0.7923 -0.7321 
   [0.0129] [0.0129] [0.0129]   [0.6567] [0.6532] [0.6473] 
Poole-Rosenthal 
Ideology Score    -0.0065 -0.0022    -2.499 -2.3897 
    [0.0320] [0.0324]    [1.7926] [1.8480] 
Democratic 
Voteshare     -0.022     3.7041 
     [0.0554]     [3.1949] 
Observations 902 902 902 896 877 1404 1404 1404 1397 1356 
R-squared 0.89 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.66 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.68 
Note: Robust standard errors, clustered at the state*electoral term level, in brackets. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels 
respectively. All specifications include state and year fixed effects. 
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Appendix Table 13           
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Dependent Variable: 
 Gini (pre-tax) Gini (post-tax) 
Indicator: Democrat 
Governor 0.0054 -0.0646 -0.0756 -0.0995 -0.0947 -0.2158 -0.2951** -0.3082** -0.3459** -0.2844 
 [0.1431] [0.1411] [0.1435] [0.1434] [0.2136] [0.1372] [0.1299] [0.1345] [0.1342] [0.1959] 
Log(Population)  1.3153* 1.3182* 1.21 1.2134  1.5869* 1.5258* 1.4857* 1.3533 
  [0.7754] [0.7870] [0.7973] [0.8103]  [0.8387] [0.8494] [0.8604] [0.8744] 
Share of Pop. <15  16.555 16.2246 16.9788 17.3697  50.7211*** 50.3737*** 51.0771*** 52.0237*** 
  [10.4597] [10.4717] [10.6165] [10.7244]  [9.8885] [9.9144] [9.9389] [10.2026] 
Share of Pop. >65  29.3852** 28.6172** 29.7854** 29.8156**  36.4860** 35.5867** 35.6897** 36.0286** 
  [14.2680] [14.3091] [14.7237] [14.8341]  [15.7832] [15.7981] [16.0648] [16.1916] 
Share of Pop. Black  37.3053*** 37.1861*** 37.1373*** 38.4961***  29.3515** 29.4133** 29.5347** 24.6464* 
  [8.8220] [8.8266] [8.7935] [9.5457]  [13.9704] [14.0189] [14.0944] [14.5697] 
Indicator: 
Democrats Control 
Both Houses   -0.1248 -0.1789 -0.2014   -0.1182 -0.2157 -0.2533 
   [0.1962] [0.1959] [0.1966]   [0.1973] [0.1911] [0.1925] 
Indicator: 
Republicans Control 
Both Houses   -0.1662 -0.1873 -0.1753   -0.0929 -0.0957 -0.1189 
   [0.2316] [0.2355] [0.2364]   [0.2247] [0.2265] [0.2276] 
Poole-Rosenthal 
Ideology Score    0.4109 0.436    0.12 0.1363 
    [0.7814] [0.7863]    [0.6426] [0.6419] 
Democratic 
Voteshare     0.0936     -0.4235 
     [1.0466]     [0.9478] 
Observations 1404 1404 1404 1397 1356 948 948 948 941 922 
R-squared 0.77 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.79 0.83 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.85 
Note: Robust standard errors, clustered at the state*electoral term level, in brackets. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels 
respectively. All specifications include state and year fixed effects. 
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Appendix Table 14           
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Dependent Variable: 
 Unemployment rate (%) Average NAEP 4th grade score 
Indicator: Democrat 
Governor -0.1846* -0.1760* -0.1635 -0.1727 -0.2895* 0.3775 0.2828 0.288 0.2575 0.6204 
 [0.1041] [0.1003] [0.1031] [0.1050] [0.1594] [0.3702] [0.3663] [0.3675] [0.3666] [0.4916] 
Log(Population)  -0.242 -0.1771 -0.2664 -0.1743  7.0931 7.2269 6.2746 6.6926 
  [0.5692] [0.5859] [0.5928] [0.6065]  [6.2841] [6.1506] [6.2200] [6.3425] 
Share of Pop. <15  17.4828** 17.9370** 18.6811** 19.1773**  65.8593** 66.3762** 73.9644** 75.3920** 
  [7.8849] [7.9413] [7.9566] [8.0992]  [28.3504] [28.4231] [29.7553] [29.8744] 
Share of Pop. >65  -21.3583* -19.9406 -17.5904 -17.7729  -1.9725 -2.2634 4.3375 8.8398 
  [12.5878] [12.6794] [12.7119] [12.8501]  [66.7487] [66.7405] [67.1822] [66.0176] 
Share of Pop. Black  -18.5977** -19.0215** -19.0108** -15.7945**  -16.7177 -19.4958 -19.8717 -19.9654 
  [7.8876] [7.9871] [7.9972] [7.8776]  [71.2695] [71.7655] [72.2610] [70.6665] 
Indicator: 
Democrats Control 
Both Houses   0.1518 0.1585 0.1313   0.2557 0.2696 0.1447 
   [0.1724] [0.1775] [0.1817]   [0.5062] [0.5012] [0.4963] 
Indicator: 
Republicans Control 
Both Houses   -0.0014 -0.004 0.0166   0.0265 -0.0104 -0.0534 
   [0.1442] [0.1431] [0.1433]   [0.4064] [0.4068] [0.4184] 
Poole-Rosenthal 
Ideology Score    0.5152 0.5594    1.1783 0.9656 
    [0.5151] [0.5228]    [1.2697] [1.2106] 
Democratic 
Voteshare     0.7735     -2.2128 
     [0.8398]     [1.9337] 
Observations 1122 1108 1108 1101 1075 381 367 367 366 366 
R-squared 0.72 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.93 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 
Note: Robust standard errors, clustered at the state*electoral term level, in brackets. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels 
respectively. All specifications include state and year fixed effects. 
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Appendix Table 15           
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Dependent Variable: 
 Property crimes per 100,000 people Violent crimes per 100,000 people 
Indicator: Democrat 
Governor -64.938 -61.0956 -56.7582 -54.6538 56.512 -6.6894 -10.0581 -10.3618 -9.9462 -5.9597 
 [45.7197] [43.1164] [43.2237] [43.7809] [66.0381] [8.2755] [7.8852] [7.8349] [7.8513] [11.3124] 
Log(Population)  312.0705 333.3871 334.5766 295.2966  200.876*** 203.962*** 198.181*** 211.832*** 
  [218.3880] [225.4918] [230.5694] [228.2868]  [35.2043] [36.1313] [36.5350] [37.1158] 
Share of Pop. <15  -20,746*** -20,648*** -20,832*** -20,547***  -2,686*** -2,689*** -2,730*** -2,333*** 
  [3,251.473] [3,269.471] [3,276.786] [3,321.614]  [545.9003] [545.9630] [548.3770] [547.7091] 
Share of Pop. >65  -16,233*** -15,868*** -16,397*** -15,168***  881.3847 868.8584 677.4871 723.3141 
  [4,057.476] [4,035.608] [4,123.648] [4,150.137]  [719.4449] [714.0676] [718.1295] [737.3495] 
Share of Pop. Black  -2,253.18 -2,311.45 -2,391.29 -2,102.65  1,436.7*** 1,428.1*** 1,382.2*** 1,986*** 
  [1,941.526] [1,945.991] [1,952.340] [2,282.084]  [444.3832] [443.8758] [442.3140] [523.2393] 
Indicator: 
Democrats Control 
Both Houses   66.5437 66.0175 51.7855   -2.3128 -2.4051 -3.7815 
   [60.9935] [62.1589] [62.8614]   [11.1586] [11.3034] [10.9961] 
Indicator: 
Republicans Control 
Both Houses   12.9535 1.6167 1.3918   -10.7106 -17.3649* -14.8765 
   [55.9226] [56.9881] [56.3685]   [9.2329] [9.4718] [9.1420] 
Poole-Rosenthal 
Ideology Score    -0.7052 7.8437    28.2919 27.2182 
    [123.2458] [128.0372]    [24.5010] [23.8120] 
Democratic 
Voteshare     -739.854**     -14.3548 
     [341.7400]     [62.1912] 
Observations 1461 1461 1461 1455 1396 1461 1461 1461 1455 1396 
R-squared 0.89 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.88 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 
Note: Robust standard errors, clustered at the state*electoral term level, in brackets. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels 
respectively. All specifications include state and year fixed effects. 
 
 
 
  41
 
Appendix Table 16           
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Dependent Variable: 
 Murder rate per 100,000 people Suicide rate per 100,000 people 
Indicator: Democrat 
Governor -0.079 -0.1018 -0.0679 -0.0819 -0.0408 -0.2432** -0.1579 -0.1356 -0.1163 -0.1403 
 [0.1264] [0.1236] [0.1200] [0.1203] [0.1723] [0.1215] [0.1180] [0.1180] [0.1183] [0.1822] 
Log(Population)  -0.6765 -0.4411 -0.548 -0.4469  -1.8172*** -1.9223*** -1.9260*** -1.9206*** 
  [0.5657] [0.5469] [0.5507] [0.5394]  [0.6489] [0.6488] [0.6629] [0.6734] 
Share of Pop. <15  -4.6319 -3.8033 -3.1929 -2.8681  -0.5827 -0.2412 -1.6948 -1.3693 
  [8.8311] [8.5913] [8.7060] [9.0261]  [10.0682] [10.2279] [10.1848] [10.5183] 
Share of Pop. >65  -15.6797 -12.6337 -11.9422 -11.3548  33.6998*** 35.4805*** 30.8675*** 31.6412*** 
  [10.8101] [10.3837] [10.7938] [10.9796]  [10.9834] [11.0324] [10.9979] [11.1288] 
Share of Pop. Black  27.6421*** 26.9965*** 26.8628*** 28.2340***  -36.828*** -36.615*** -37.481*** -39.433*** 
  [5.8628] [5.7488] [5.7843] [6.6285]  [4.4969] [4.4961] [4.4638] [4.8422] 
Indicator: 
Democrats Control 
Both Houses   0.5552*** 0.5417*** 0.5627***   0.1834 0.168 0.1828 
   [0.1837] [0.1868] [0.1866]   [0.1821] [0.1830] [0.1857] 
Indicator: 
Republicans Control 
Both Houses   -0.0463 -0.0775 -0.1124   0.3363* 0.2468 0.2409 
   [0.1472] [0.1513] [0.1517]   [0.1921] [0.1931] [0.1945] 
Poole-Rosenthal 
Ideology Score    0.4567 0.3279    0.0245 -0.0262 
    [0.3683] [0.3618]    [0.5274] [0.5335] 
Democratic 
Voteshare     -0.3455     0.3681 
     [0.8971]     [0.8501] 
Observations 1461 1461 1461 1455 1396 1164 1164 1164 1160 1121 
R-squared 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.84 0.85 0.86 0.86 0.86 
Note: Robust standard errors, clustered at the state*electoral term level, in brackets. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels 
respectively. All specifications include state and year fixed effects. 
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Appendix Table 17      
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent Variable: 
 Log Population 
Indicator: Democrat 
Governor 0.0036 -0.0044 -0.0018 -0.0069 0.0135 
 [0.0102] [0.0099] [0.0098] [0.0088] [0.0124] 
Share of Pop. <15  3.1040*** 3.1574*** 3.0717*** 1.7045*** 
  [0.4005] [0.3962] [0.3929] [0.4158] 
Share of Pop. >65  -4.1350*** -4.1268*** -2.8692*** -4.8348*** 
  [0.5632] [0.5593] [0.5386] [0.5659] 
Share of Pop. Black  -1.9180*** -1.8762*** -1.1073*** -1.0051*** 
  [0.2292] [0.2271] [0.2371] [0.3129] 
Indicator: 
Democrats Control 
Both Houses   -0.0651*** -0.0560*** -0.0479*** 
   [0.0151] [0.0138] [0.0139] 
Indicator: 
Republicans Control 
Both Houses   0.0529*** 0.0427*** 0.0397*** 
   [0.0151] [0.0138] [0.0137] 
Poole-Rosenthal 
Ideology Score    0.3419*** 0.3241*** 
    [0.0290] [0.0291] 
Democratic 
Voteshare     -0.1493** 
     [0.0647] 
Observations 2423 2423 2423 2187 1999 
R-squared 0.96 0.96 0.97 0.97 0.98 
Note: Robust standard errors, clustered at the state*electoral term level, in brackets. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels 
respectively. All specifications include state and year fixed effects. 
 
 
